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Weather forecast or rain-dance? On inter-war business barometers.
1.
I present here the framework of a research, still far from being 2. In the first decades of the twentieth century statistical information on economic events opened up to a larger public of businessmen. This was mainly caused by the action of major operators. Besides the State, big corporations and banks were well acquainted with the advantages of a systematical examination of current events. Still, they preferred that also smaller operators were not too much unaware of market conditions, as to avoid sharp and unforeseeable shocks in the general course of business (Ayres 1924) . So they thought it would be useful to spread the news gathered by their research departments by means of informatory circulars, in order to avoid market turbulence capable of threatening investment stability.
Later on, specialized agencies started gathering, processing and publishing data, putting services born inside private companies (but soon externalized) at the public's disposal. The first business indicators appeared in the United States before the war as an instrument to get speculative profits (Sauvy, 1948, 15) . In short, it was a matter of meeting the business demand for statistically based forecasts (Armatte, 1992, 130-131) .
Commercial forecasting agencies like the Brookmire Economic Service and the Babson Statistical Organization produced business barometers based on simple principles -that still did not seem trivial to their public. As we shall see later on, some scholars complained of such publications offering businessmen "nothing but the photograph of the forecasts they've just made, so that they take a line with their action" (Gini, 1930, 243 It is now worth explaining briefly how business barometers worked.
The most famous ones were the above-mentioned Babson and Brookmire, as well as the Harvard forecasting system. The Babsonchart -published since 1910 -consisted of a "composite index" of United States economic activity, built up by weighting some "sensitive" indexes, and plotted as a broken line on a graph with time in abscissa and index values in ordinate.
The resulting curve was interpolated by the "X-Y line", "corresponding to the general business growth, to the increase of wealth in the considered period". The "X-Y line" was built up in order that it roughly equalized areas included between it and the "composite index" curve. The forecasting mechanism of such a barometer originated from "Newton's action and reaction principle" or, in less bombastic words, from the assumption of approximate equivalence between the areas representing booms and the 5 ones representing depressions. The Babson Statistical Organization kept the way the "X-Y line" was concretely built up secret for a long time. But
Babson's forecast were actually also relying on relentless surveys of leading businessmen's opinions (Friedman, 2006, 12-13) , this way working also as sort of an "index of the confidence" of investors.
The Brookmire Economic Service barometer was based on a completely different principle. Economic events were summarily classified into three groups: banking, speculation and business. Forecasts were based on the observation that most of the times "when banking starts a main variation (increase or decrease), stock prices will follow some months later and some more months later indicators of general business trends" (Vance, 1925, 79) . It is clear that such a forecasting system involved the opinion, inspired by the works of Irving Fisher, that money and credit are the independent variable in business cycle (widely quoted in Brookmire, 1913).
As it was based on the systematic examination of sequences between the trends of different indexes, Brookmire was an immediate precursor of the most sophisticated barometer built up by the Harvard Committee for Economic Research and published starting from January 1919.
The Harvard Committee director, Warren M. Persons, was convinced that existing barometers could be surpassed by means of a sharper distinction between gathering and publishing data, on the one hand, and analyzing and interpreting them, on the other. Therefore the Committee started manipulating published monthly economic data series, in order to correct them for seasonal variation and for the "secular (long-time) trend"; they then continued, charting each series as thus corrected in order to compare its fluctuations with others. Afterwards, the series were classified into groups according to the timing of their cyclical variations. Only at this point did they undertake the construction, out of the series included within any such group, of a composite series reflecting the average course of fluctuation for the group as a whole, and these "composite indexes" were superposed "upon a single chart" (Bullock-Crum, 1932, 132) .
"No theory as to the interrelations of various aspects of the economic movement had been in mind when the investigation was undertaken".
Nevertheless, "the results showed that (1) each of the three curves was associated with a particular type of economic activity"; "and (2) the relations of the three curves to each other at any given time appeared to afford a sound basis for forecasting". This way, many years later, Bullock and Crum (1932, 132-133) claimed the empirical origin of the Harvard method, based on the sequentiality of curves A (speculation), B (business) and C (money and credit).
The order of the curves could give the wrong impression that changes in C (money conditions) were not important as a barometer of general business conditions, since they occurred after changes in B (business). As a matter of fact, the Harvard Committee used since 1920 both the A and the C curves in its forecasts of the B curve movements: in particular, "a decrease in A and a simultaneous increase in C" indicated the approaching crisis (BullockPersons-Crum, 1927, 77) . As Persons (1930, 290) Karsten, 1926; Bullock-Persons-Crum, 1927) . The same forecasting methods were also adopted by some big businesses in order to plan their orders and investments: American Telegraphs and Telephones used the Harvard methodology to build up a barometer on its own, and General Motors usually confronted Harvard forecasting with its own sales estimations (Richardson, 1929, 184-189 (Morgan, 1990, 66; Deblock 2000) .
In some cases, caution prevailed. The Swedish Ministry of Commerce published a barometer modeled on the Harvard one, but being afraid of exaggerated expectations of the industrial world, suspended publication and 9 resumed it only after drawing the cautions required for its interpretation to the attention of the public. In Italy, the Universities of Padua and Rome started publishing the "Indici del movimento economico italiano", still excluding any forecasting concerns, in view of the doubts expressed on the matter by the president of the publishing committee, Corrado Gini (1926) : Gini (1930, 245) defined the indexes compiled by the Italian committee as a "rain gauge" with respect to forecasting "barometers".
In 1926, the institution of a Committee of experts on business barometers on the initiative of the League of Nations was a sign of the increasing importance attributed to business cycle analysis. Such a committee was established considering that "a better evaluation of all data concerning economic factors" should be "useful in steering credit policy, so to partially soften the extreme fluctuations of economic activity, which is harmful to investment steadiness" (Gini, 1926, 4) . Persons (1930, 307) himself interdependence exists between two variables, "the reaction of the belated variable on the earlier one" will be "ahead of time because of this knowledge". Still, only if "this reaction, as it is the case of the business fluctuations and the discount rate, is fulfilled as a compensation", will the effect be that of "mitigating fluctuations of earlier variable". Should that not be the case -as, in his opinion (Gini, 1926, 14-15) , it happened most of the times (in the relationship between prices and wages, or between domestic and external prices) -"the belated variable tends with its variations to react on the earlier variable, which determines it, making its variations more marked", this way triggering off, instead of a regulation mechanism, "a vicious circle".
To sum up, Gini wished for a development of money and credit control as an instrument to mitigate economic fluctuations, but was persuaded that a wider circulation of economic information would have pro-cyclical and, at worst, destabilizing effects. It is interesting to see the consonance between this argument and the criticism by Oskar Morgenstern (1928 , summarized in Marget, 1929 on the circulation of economic forecasts.
Morgenstern started by denying any possibility of applying the theory of probability to economics, given the lack of homogeneity and statistical independence of economic data. In his opinion, the Harvard Committee was not applying the statistical theory of probability to its data, but a "semiological" theory of causes, which could be falsified. This "experiment" could be very useful in order to foster the development of economic theory, allowing it to test the causal connections it was supposing.
But when its results were circulated to the public and found practical use in steering entrepreneurial choices and institutional economic policy, they could have destabilizing effects. In fact, a widespread reliance on economic forecasts endangered the "rationality" of economic processes by modifying entrepreneurs' "reference points".
Morgenstern concluded pointing out the need to separate the scientific research on business trends from the sale of a forecasting service to the public, but also from its use for monetary policy. Interestingly, it was starting from his 1928 analysis of the conditions and possibilities of economic forecast that Morgenstern developed his considerations on the "perfect forecasting" problem. The same idea that "the calculation of the effects of our choices is always based on the expected choices of the others"
was at the origin of his first contributions on game theory (von NeumannMorgenstern, 1944 ).
This opens an attractive path of research in the history of economic thought, which is not the case to follow here. Also from the point of view of the history of economic thought, the literature has already shown how following developments in economic science brought this empirical approach to the study of business cycles, so strong in the Twenties, to lose its dominant role in the Thirties. For instance, it would be possible to make reference to Udny Yule (1926) radical criticism of statistical correlations between time-series, or to the concurrent "development of the alternative quantitative programme in econometrics" (Morgan, 1990, 67) . But let's go back to the story of the Harvard barometer, and then to economic history. The Committee itself had a different version, if we rely on an article explicitly accounting for the interpretation and performance of the Index. Bullock and Crum (1932, 138) relate that, "during the short post-war cycle that ended in the depression of 1921, the performance of our Index" performed 14 very well. Still, after 1922 the situation became more complicated as, "with the gradual return of prosperity, the federal reserve authorities were free for the first time to develop credit policies suited to normal times". The steps the Fed and the Department of Commerce took in those years to deal with the economic trend "introduced a new factor which seemed to make it absolutely necessary to supplement our index chart by independent study" (Bullock and Crum, 1932, 139) .
That was why the Committee preferred to take a careful attitude when, in the summer of 1928, the relative positions of the A and C curves seemed to point to "the approach of a cyclical decline into depression". The prevailing opinion was that the A, B and C curves were not to be read mechanically, and in fact "the avoidance of a mechanical reading proved correct during the next eight or nine months". So, when "the chart gave a new and much more emphatic warning" in the spring of 1929, this once again went unheeded. And yet, "if followed mechanically, the chart would have given a satisfactory forecast even of the extraordinary developments late in 1929".
What was then that drove the Harvard statisticians to underrate their own index indications so stubbornly? Following the account of Bullock and Crum, it would be essentially the lack of an analysis of the international situation, which concealed "the unfavorable effects which high money rates in this country" were producing in Europe and elsewhere (Bullock and Crum, 1932, 142) reducing the circulating quantity of money and pushing prices down (Friedman, 2006, 15-16 (Dominguez-Fair-Shapiro, 1988 ).
Still, this does not mean that barometers had no effect on entrepreneurial choices. Making reference to Gini and Following the optimism of forecasters on a huge recovery, some still-sound businesses could have been pushed to invest on credit, given the low relative prices of investment goods and the decrease in interest rates which followed the crash and went on until 1931. Their attempt to exploit a supposed temporary downturn would fail dramatically. The decrease of the money stock which followed the 1931 Fed decision to rise interest rates (Friedman-Schwarz, 1963) , the permanent decline in aggregate demand (Temin, 1976) , the collapse of commodity prices (Kindleberger, 1986) were all working against the recovery. The consequence would be a further deepening of the Depression, caused by the bankrupt of most of surviving businesses, falling on the 1933 bank crisis.
The economic and historical literature on the investment trend during the Depression (Steindl, 1951; Bernstein, 1987) offers a lot of data useful to verify the compatibility of this hypothesis with the general economic trend. Business case studies on major companies allow, on the other hand, checking the timing of investment choices of single businesses and their sources of information. The successful use of sales reports by the General Motors Co. (Kuhn, 1986) or the introduction of internal comptrollers at Sears, Roebuck & Co. (Emmet-Jeuck, 1950 ) suggest that when businesses were able to collect and use the information that was really concerning them, they could react to the crisis. Still, this is a matter of very big businesses: smaller companies were relying on market information and probably on general forecasts.
It would then be interesting to know exactly which firms were subscribers receiving the "Weekly Report" of the Harvard Committee, and to know if they were using it in their decision-making process.
The papers of the Harvard Committee are deposited at the Becker 
